When must national judges raise European law issues on their own motion? by unknown
ERA Forum (2011) 11: 525–529
DOI 10.1007/s12027-010-0177-5
A RT I C L E
When must national judges raise European law issues
on their own motion?
Tadeusz Erecin´ski
Published online: 3 November 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article discusses the Polish legal framework for raising issues ex of-
ficio in civil procedure, and how this interacts with requirements laid down by the
European Court of Justice that certain issues of European Union law be raised on the
national judge’s own motion. The article looks at how the Polish courts have complied
with the case-law of the European Court of Justice in this respect.
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At the outset it must be emphasised that, in principle, the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union has left to national legislators the decision as to whether there ought to
be a duty on national courts to raise European Union law issues on their own motion.
It might be therefore interesting to analyse this subject from the Polish perspective,
using the example of civil procedure.
The application of a law by Polish courts on their own motion in civil procedure
depends on two main factors. First, it depends on whether what is concerned is a
substantial or procedural law, and secondly, at what instance the case is adjudicated.
Consequently, it also depends on European law which, since Poland joined the Eu-
ropean Union in 2004, forms part of the Polish legal system. European law contains
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both substantive and procedural norms (forming a European law of civil procedure),
and it is necessary to take this differentiation into account in this analysis.
As for the application of substantive law by the court of first instance, Polish civil
procedure is fully based on the principle da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius. According to
this rule, a Polish court applies substantive law ex officio, without regard to the fact of
whether the parties raised any legal basis to their claims. Even if the parties raise some
legal basis to their claims in the course of the proceedings, the court is not bound
by this legal basis and is obliged to evaluate the issue independently. The above-
mentioned principle derives not from any particular provision of the civil procedure
code but from the nature of judicial powers and is applied without exception by the
Polish courts.
The same applies in the course of appellate proceedings, as Polish law provides a
so-called full appeal (cum beneficio novorum), which means that the court of second
instance is obliged to hear the evidence independently with the trial following the one
in the court of first instance. Thus the court of appeal must consider the claims with
regard to the substantive law and is not bound by the claims made by the appellant. On
the other hand the court is obliged to apply procedural law ex officio only in the first
instance. Taking into account that the procedural law is in fact a public law regulation
determining the correct course for proceedings, it is, in principle, independent of the
initiative of the parties.
In the course of appellate proceedings, the duty to apply on its own motion pro-
cedural rules is quite different. In the light of decision by the seven judges of the
Supreme Court of 31 January, 2008, the court of appeal is not obliged to consider
ex officio infringements of procedural law by the court of first instance, with the ex-
ception of particular provisions, the application of which the court must control on
its own motion (for example, invalidity of proceedings caused by a party’s being de-
prived of a right of defence). The reason for this is that the view is taken that the
parties should signal to the court of first instance potential infringements of proce-
dural law and should not wait to raise them until the appeal proceedings. Besides,
some procedural failures on the part of the first instance court will become outdated
in the appeal proceedings.
Accordingly, Polish courts, both at first and second instance, are obliged to apply
substantive European Union law on their own motion, notwithstanding the claims of
the parties. This is particularly true for those European law norms which are directly
applicable in the Polish legal system and may constitute a legal basis for a judgment.
However, it is also important for the purposes of the ex officio interpretation of na-
tional law by Polish courts in accordance with the requirements of European Union
law (so-called ‘indirect effect’). With regard to the application of European Union
procedural law, such an obligation lies, in principle, exclusively on the court of first
instance. Second instance courts should not, in general, take infringements of Euro-
pean Union procedural law into account on their own motion. Nonetheless, it must be
emphasised that the traditional scope of European Union procedural law (e.g., con-
cerning jurisdiction, recognition and the declaration of enforceability of judgments)
covers in any case the issues which should be controlled by the court of second in-
stance. The best example of that is the issue of the existence of jurisdiction of Polish
courts, which in most cases is taken into account ex officio, because it is, in princi-
ple, an absolute prerequisite for court proceedings. Some problems may arise when
When must national judges raise European law issues 527
it comes to a Polish second instance court applying on its own motion European
Union civil procedure law with regard to the new unified European proceedings (the
European Payment Order and the European Small Claims Procedure) and to legal
aid (documents delivery, taking evidence abroad). Failures of the court of first in-
stance regarding European Union law in this domain should be controlled only on
the parties’ motion, unless these failures lead to the invalidity of the proceedings (for
example, an incorrect delivery of a motion starting proceedings leading to the result
that a party is deprived of the possibility of defence).
Much more complicated is the problem of applying European Union law ex offi-
cio in the course of cassation proceedings by the Supreme Court. According to Art.
39813 §1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court examines a cassation
complaint in the framework of the legal grounds given for the same. This means that,
apart from the question of the invalidity of the proceedings, the Supreme Court does
not have the competence to control infringements which have not been indicated in
the cassation complaint. This leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Court will not
raise on its own motion European Union law issues—either those of a substantial
or of a procedural nature—unless they cause the invalidity of the proceedings. This
conclusion was confirmed by the Supreme Court in its judgment of December 18,
2006. This judgment for the first time pointed out criteria which allow the Supreme
Court to go beyond this limitation and to control the infringement of European Union
law ex officio. The Supreme Court concluded that this was possible in three situa-
tions.
First, where the Supreme Court, as the court of the last instance, is obliged, under
Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to request
a preliminary ruling in order to interpret or assess validity of a European Union act,
if a decision on the question is necessary to enable the Court to pass judgment.
Secondly, when the subject matter of Polish and European Union law is identical
but the cassation complaint refers merely to Polish norms and the indirect application
of European Union law is possible.
Thirdly, when the subject matter of Polish and European Union law is identical.
Here, the requirement of eventual analysis of the infringement of European Union
law may arise when it is necessary to interpret national legal provisions according to
European Union provisions.
In relation to the first criterion, it must be stressed that without doubt, the Supreme
Court, when proceeding with a cassation complaint, always acts as a court of last
instance within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.1 However the problem lies in the
inherent nature of the obligation to refer a question for a preliminary ruling, as this
obligation depends on the answer to the question of whether the ruling is necessary
to render a national judgment by the Supreme Court. The Court enjoys considerable
freedom in this matter. Until now, the Supreme Court of Poland has made a reference
for a preliminary ruling on four occasions.2 Moreover, other civil courts have made
1See the Supreme Court resolution of February 20, 2008.
2Supreme Court: III SK 27/08 – Court of Justice: C-99/09, SC: III SK 2/09 – CJ: C-375/09, SC: III SK
16/09, I UK 344/08.
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a reference on five occasions for preliminary rulings and administrative courts have
made preliminary references on fourteen occasions.
As for the second criterion, this concerns in the main a situation of where a na-
tional piece of legislation (forming the legal basis of the judgment under review) im-
plements a European Union directive but the implementation is incorrect. In such a
case, despite the absence of a particular claim in the cassation complaint, the Supreme
Court should take into account an infringement of European Union law when a party
indicates, as the grounds for a cassation complaint, Polish provisions which imple-
ment a European Union directive.
The third criterion concerns those situations where European Union law is directly
applicable but the party does not refer to it expressly in the cassation complaint—but,
instead, refers to a national provision relating to the same issue—and moreover, the
national provision is incompatible with European Union law or else the interpretation
of this national provision applied by the court of lower instance does not comply
with the European Union law. The Supreme Court judgment of 4 January, 2008 may
serve as an example of such a situation. Here the Court took into account the issue
of infringement of European Union law. The case involved the claim of a Polish
conductor for early retirement where Polish law provided such a possibility only for
female conductors. The Supreme Court raised a European Union law issue on its
own motion, holding that the unjustified discrimination based on sex is contrary to
Art. 4(1) of Council Directive 79/7/EC.
The obligation to interpret provisions of national law in accordance with the oblig-
ations of European Union law also comes within the scope of the present analysis of
the criteria according to which the Supreme Court will take into account European
Union issues on its own motion. The judgment of the Court of 18 December, 2006
may serve as an illustration. The Court held that an interpretation which had been
given to the notion of the “date of employer’s insolvency” was contrary to the aims
of Council Directive 80/987/EC and to the case-law of the European Court of Justice.
From the practical point of view, all three of the criteria described above can be
understood in the following manner. A case reviewed by the Supreme Court has the
status of a “European case” when it deals with an issue regulated by European Union
law which has not been taken into consideration or has been considered incorrectly
by the courts of lower instance.
The above-analysed criteria enable the Supreme Court to raise European Union
law issues on its own motion whenever the claims raised by the plaintiff in the cas-
sation complaint refer—even indirectly—to a subject matter regulated by European
Union law. If the facts of the case come within the scope of European Union law and
the court of lower instance does not interpret national provisions in compliance with
European Union law (and, moreover, the plaintiff has not referred to European Union
law in the cassation complaint), the Supreme Court will assume that the infringe-
ment of substantive law claimed in the cassation complaint is a result of the incorrect
interpretation. If a court of lower instance applies national provisions incompatible
with European Union law, then the infringement of the Polish provision claimed in
the cassation complaint concerns their application (as, because of the primacy of Eu-
ropean Union law, the courts of lower instances, should have refused application of
national provisions contrary to European Union law).
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Conclusion
To date, European Union law issues have been raised ex officio to the same extent
as issues relating to national law only. In the Polish legal system this has meant that
substantive European Union law issues must be raised ex officio both in first and
second instance proceedings. As regards procedural law, this is always taken into
account ex officio by the court of first instance. In case of the court of second instance,
it is considered on the basis of a particular claim, unless it leads to the invalidity of
the proceedings. As for the Supreme Court, there is a rule that the Court is bound
by the grounds expressed in the cassation complaint, except for the situation of the
invalidity of proceedings.
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